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Abstract: Greek comedy is full of quotable maxims. According to a literal reading, 
the comedians might be seen as custodians of traditional gnomic wisdom, along with 
their tragic counterparts. Nevertheless, it is argued here that maxims in comedy are 
different from maxims in other contexts. Comic maxims typically appear ‘within 
inverted commas’, not just in a literal sense (because of their inherent 
‘quotationality’) but in a figurative sense (because of their pervasive irony and self-
consciousness). Examples from Menander, Antiphanes, Diphilus and others are used 
to demonstrate that the comedians can be seen as playing around with the content and 
form of traditional wisdom. Sometimes they seem to be poking fun at the maxim as a 




Ancient Greek comedies were full of maxims encapsulating traditional wisdom in a 
conveniently memorable and quotable form. Modern scholars conventionally refer to 
such maxims as gnomai, though the Greeks themselves were not consistent in their 
use of terminology. (Words such as gnome, paroimia, logos and apophthegma are 
found more or less indiscriminately throughout the literary tradition, in much the 
same way as the categories of ‘proverb’, ‘maxim’, ‘saying’, ‘generalization’ and 
‘aphorism’ overlap with one another in standard English usage.1) In terms of their 
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1 See Russo (1997), esp. 50-59, on the use of such terms as hypotheke, paroimia, 
apophthegma, gnome, legomenon, etc. Aristotle (Rhet. 2.1394a22-6, 3.1413a15) 
explicitly distinguishes between gnomai (general statements) and paroimiai 
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content, all such maxims are closely comparable: they purport to convey universal 
insights into human life, and they tend to be utterly traditional in the sentiments they 
express; originality is seldom a distinguishing feature. Comic maxims range across 
the conventional territory of Greek popular morality, including such subjects as 
wealth, love, marriage, friendship, familial relationships, and the vicissitudes of 
fortune. They differ slightly in terms of their form – for instance, some are 
considerably longer or shorter than others, some of them explicitly refer to their own 
traditional content using words such as logos or paroimia,2 and some of them contain 
rhymes, wordplay, or other rhetorical features – but they are all characterized by a 
pithy or epigrammatic turn of phrase.  
In fact, these maxims can be seen as possessing a quality called quotationality. 
Gary Saul Morson, who coined this expression, defines it as follows: it ‘confers on 
phrases a degree of otherness’, and it is said to create an ‘aura’ or a vague feeling that 
something is being quoted, even when the utterance in question is newly created. Not 
every utterance that is quoted necessarily possesses quotationality: in this respect 
Morson usefully distinguishes between ‘quotations’ (which do) and ‘citations’ (which 
do not). But a phrase that does have this quality will typically be ‘short’, 
‘memorizable’, ‘interesting’, ‘complete in itself’, ‘shared’, and ‘potentially 
autonomous’ (of speaker, author or context); it will also possess an inherent 
‘doubleness’ or ambiguity, either because it can function in or out of context, or 
because it has an implied ‘shadowy second speaker, who is not identical to the 
speaker of the source’.3  
Comic maxims conform to this definition of quotationality. They are short and 
memorable; they have a high degree of iterability; they tend to stand out from any 
surrounding text because of the use of framing devices (e.g. their positioning at the 
 
(proverbs), but this distinction is not widely observed by other writers. Note that both 
Aristotle and Theophrastus wrote books (now lost) called Περὶ παροιμιῶν (Diog. 
Laert. 5.26, 5.45). 
2 E.g. Alexis fr. 88, Mnesimachus fr. 9, Philemon fr. 139, Platon, Phaon fr. 188.3-4, 
Menander, Aspis 189-91 and Koneiazomenai fr. 1.  
3 Morson (2011) 37-8, 81-5, 96-7. Cf. Garber (2003) 16 on the ‘ventriloquism’ of 
quotations, or Empson (1930) 51 on ‘lines that stand out...like quotations on a 
tombstone’. 
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start or end of speeches, or the fact that they normally fill complete lines of verse, 
facilitating maximum detachability); they have an inherent doubleness about them, 
allowing them to function both in and out of context; they are often intertextual in a 
broad sense, in that they are adapted from earlier texts or the tradition of Greek 
popular wisdom more generally; they seem to blur the narratological category of 
voice; they also blur the boundaries between past and present, or between the world of 
the play and the real world of the audience. By including numerous maxims in their 
plays, the Greek comedians might seem to be encouraging us to view them as 
custodians of traditional wisdom, along with their epic and lyric predecessors; but, 
more importantly, they are conferring a high level of quotability on their own work.  
One of the biggest questions posed by this material concerns the importance of 
literary genre when interpreting maxims. That is, are comic maxims significantly 
different from maxims in other literary or non-literary contexts? I suggest that the 
answer is yes. Comedy is not like other genres. Its ubiquitous humour and irony 
inevitably affect our response to anything that we encounter there. As I have argued 
elsewhere, one of the defining features of Greek comedy is that it typically presents 
its subject-matter, as it were, inside inverted commas – that is, in a manner that is 
pervasively self-conscious or ironical.4 The comedians tend to take material from 
elsewhere in literature or life and play around with it, subjecting it to ludic, deflatory 
or critical treatment. Comedy characteristically invites its audience to see familiar 
phenomena in unfamiliar ways, or to laugh at things that are normally perceived as 
serious.  
In this article I suggest that the comedians are not simply presenting their 
audience with traditional wisdom in neatly packaged gobbets, as other poets do, in 
order to lend authority and moral depth to their work. It is possible to read many 
comic maxims absolutely straight, as genuine ethical guidance for life, and most 
critics seem to do exactly that,5 but I prefer to read them more obliquely. All the 
 
4 [         ]. 
5 For the view that Menander’s comedy aims at serious social, ethical or philosophical 
teaching, see (e.g.) Barigazzi (1965); Cinaglia (2014); Hurst (2015, esp. 33-50 on 
maxims). Cf. Green (1990) 67 for the view that Menander’s maxims are ‘moralizing 
asides thrown in to give these puffball plays extra weight’. See below on the gnomic 
tradition relating to Menander and Epicharmus. 
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comic maxims discussed here should be imagined as framed by a large pair of 
inverted commas – because of their inherent ‘quotationality’, because they stand out 
from their dramatic context as detachable lines, because they reiterate familiar 
material from a wider literary or gnomological tradition, and above all because they 
are distinguished by a recurrent irony and self-consciousness. In many instances, as I 
shall demonstrate, the comedians seem to be playing around with, or questioning, the 
content and form of traditional wisdom. Sometimes they seem to be going even 
further, poking fun at the maxim as a medium of expression or, more radically, at the 
habit of quotation itself. 
It is significant that several critics and theorists treat the maxim as a distinct 
literary genre.6 This is a useful concept for our purposes, because it enables us to draw 
analogies with comedy’s treatment of other literary genres such as tragedy, epic, lyric 
poetry, and so on. Comedy’s relationship to these other genres has been widely 
interpreted in terms of parody or pastiche, or, alternatively, as a flexible and variously 
nuanced series of intergeneric dialogues.7 I suggest that comedy can similarly be seen 
as engaged in an ongoing dialogue with the maxim. The distinctively comic version 
of the maxim works by evoking, absorbing, parasitizing, distorting, subverting, or 
criticizing a genre that was extremely familiar from other types of literature and social 
situations.8  
This is not to claim that every single maxim in comedy functions in exactly 
the same way; nor is it to deny any serious ethical or didactic purpose to the comic 
genre. I strongly suspect that many of the comedians were indeed being frivolous and 
silly, with no particular moral point or message to convey. But if some of them did 
have a serious purpose, it will probably not emerge through a solemn, literal reading 
of their maxims. Rather, by creating an ironical distance between themselves and the 
traditional material, the comedians can be seen as challenging their audiences to think 
more carefully about the content of traditional popular wisdom and the form in which 
 
6 E.g. Shapiro (2000), Martin (2009); cf. Morson (2012) 11-19. 
7 See, most recently, Bakola, Prauscello and Telò (2013). Cf. Genette (1997) 1-4 for 
the concept of ‘architextuality’ as a sub-branch of intertextuality (genres or generic 
conventions are seen as ‘architexts’ determining the formal features of a new text). 
8 I am concerned with the literary context here, but cf. Martin (2009) on ‘wisdom 
performance’ and ‘social proverb use’. 
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it was passed down. Instead of simply presenting us, as other poets do, with 
supposedly universal wisdom, glib generalizations or clichés, certain comedians may 
have been prompting us to ask more profound questions about the way in which 
maxims were used by other people, the nature of true wisdom, or the ambivalent 
relationship between ‘universal’ ethical questions and specific situational contexts. 
 
I. COMEDY AND QUOTATION CULTURE 
Most of the comic maxims we now possess, in the guise of ‘fragments’, have survived 
precisely because they were quoted by other writers within antiquity. The quotation of 
decontextualized extracts – including the use of florilegia or anthologies of maxims – 
was a widespread practice throughout antiquity, for which evidence exists as early as 
the fifth and early fourth centuries BC.9 It is obvious that, for many Greeks, selective 
or non-linear reading was a normal way of engaging with texts (especially poetic and 
dramatic works).  
The popularity of excerption as a reading habit in the fourth century is 
highlighted, and made fun of, in the following extract from a scene in Menander’s 
comedy Aspis (407-15). Here the slave Daos – who is attempting to bamboozle 
another character, Smikrines, into thinking that a ‘tragic’ event has taken place – 
quotes a large number of gnomic verses excerpted from several tragedies by different 
authors:  
 
(ΔΑ.) ‘οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις π[άντ᾽ ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖ.’ 
πάλιν εὖ διαφόρως. ὦ πολ[υτίμητοι θεοί, 
ἀπροσδοκήτου πράγμα[τος] καὶ ἀ[ 
(ΣΜ.) Δᾶε κακόδαιμον, ποῖ τρέχ[εις;] 
(ΔΑ.)          καὶ το[ῦτό που. 
‘τύχη τὰ θνητῶν πράγματ,᾽ οὐκ εὐβουλία.’ 
ὑπέρευγε. ‘θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς, 
ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέληι.’ 
 
9 e.g. Ar. Ach. 398-400, Wasps 1259-60 (cf. 725-6); Hippias DK86 B6; Xen. Mem. 
1.6.14; Pl. Leg. 811a-b, Phaedr. 228b, 267c; Arist. Rhet. 2.21.2-4, 1394b-95a, Topics 
105b; Aesch. In Ctes. 135; Philochorus apud Suda Φ 441; cf. Isoc. To Nicocles 43-4 
(quoted above). For recent discussion see Konstan (2011).  
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Αἰσχύλος ὁ σεμνά— 
(ΣΜ.)          γνωμολογεῖς, τρισάθλιε; 
(ΔΑ.) ‘ἄπιστον, ἄλογον, δεινόν.’ 
(ΣΜ.)               οὐδὲ παύσεται; 
(Daos:) ‘There is no man who is fortunate in all respects’.10 Once again, excellently 
expressed! Oh, ye greatly honoured gods, what an unexpected event, and [...] 
(Smikrines:) Daos, you wretch, where are you running off to? 
(Daos:) ...and then there’s this one: ‘Chance, not planning, governs human affairs’.11  
Absolutely brilliant! ‘The god sows guilt in mortal men, whenever he wishes to destroy 
a house utterly’.12 That one’s from Aeschylus, the one who solemnly— 
(Smikrines:) Quote maxims, will you? Thrice-wretched creature! 
(Daos:) ‘Incredible, irrational, terrible’...13 
(Smikrines:) Won’t he ever stop? 
 
These verses are non-consecutive, irrelevant to the comic context, and completely 
unrelated to one another, but the crucial point is that they already resemble extracts 
from a gnomic anthology. Menander and his audience were evidently well 
accustomed to making use of tragedy in this way,14 the verb γνωμολογεῖν (‘to collect 
maxims’ vel sim.) was obviously in common usage, and the excerpts in question had 
already become ‘popular tags’ (in the words of the play’s most recent commentator).15 
This scene, alongside other examples from comedy, shows us how tragedy was 
being treated as a repository of quotations from an early date.16 But if we look for 
evidence of quotations from comedy itself, a striking fact emerges. Apart from the 
later anthologizers, who treated comic drama as a rich mine of quotable wisdom (and 
 
10 Eur. Stheneboea fr. 661.1 Kannicht. 
11 Chaeremon, Achilles Thersitoktonos fr. 2 Snell. 
12 Aesch. Niobe fr. 154 Radt. 
13 Carcinus fr. 5b Snell. 
14 The habit of quoting maxims or other decontextualized excerpts from tragedy 
provides the basis for humour in other comic passages: e.g. Diphilus, Synoris fr. 74, 
Nicostratus fr. 29, Philippides fr. 18. Wright (2013) 615-17 argues that these 
comedians are undermining or mocking this selective mode of reading texts.  
15 Ireland (2010) 100-102; cf. Cusset (2003) 144-58. 
16 Cf. Section IV below. 
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thus preserved the majority of our surviving fragments), most writers throughout the 
classical period are conspicuously lacking in gnomic quotations from comedy. This 
implies that comedy was not generally treated in the same way as other types of 
literature. When we look at the comedians’ immediate contemporaries in the late fifth 
and fourth centuries, their lack of interest in comic maxims is striking. Forensic 
orators, in particular, quote gnomic verses from a wide range of epic, tragic, and lyric 
poets, but not a single line from comedy. This may be due to the fact that comedy was 
regarded as too political to be used in a courtroom setting,17 but it may equally 
suggest that comedy was widely perceived to be lacking in seriousness. This is 
certainly the opinion of Isocrates, who contrasts comedy with writers such as Hesiod 
and Theognis and other poets whom he regards as ‘the best advisors for human life’ 
(ἀρίστους ... συμβούλους τῶι βίωι τῶι τῶν ἀνθρώπων).18 Isocrates complains that 
most readers ignore the wisdom that is to be found even in morally edifying poets 
such as these: 
 
ἔτι δ' εἴ τις ἐκλέξειε τῶν προεχόντων ποιητῶν τὰς καλουμένας γνώμας, ἐφ' αἷς ἐκεῖνοι 
μάλιστ' ἐσπούδασαν, ὁμοίως ἂν καὶ πρὸς ταύτας διετεθεῖεν· ἥδιον γὰρ ἂν κωμωιδίας 
τῆς φαυλοτάτης ἢ τῶν οὕτω τεχνικῶς πεποιημένων ἀκούσαιεν. 
Even if someone were to make a selection of the so-called gnomai of the leading poets, 
the ones that they have composed with especial care, people would treat these in just 
the same way – for they would much rather listen to the most wretched comedy than to 
poetry composed with such artistry. 
 
This passage confirms that maxims, more than any other passages from poetry, were 
excerpted and quoted as a source of wisdom or advice for life, but it also implies that 
– in Isocrates’ eyes, at least – ‘wretched’ comedy was excluded from the category of 
serious poetry. The reluctance of other writers to quote comic maxims seems to 
suggest that they mostly shared Isocrates’ viewpoint. 
 
17 The view of Perlman (1964), esp. 161-5. Cf. Scafuro (1997) on tragic quotations in 
oratory. 
18 Isoc. To Nicocles 43-4: see Hunter (2014) 77-8 on the further implications of this 
passage. Cf. Isoc. Peace 14 for denial of comedy’s status as a respectable genre. 
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In this respect another very striking fact needs to be emphasized. Although so-
called ‘middle’ and ‘new’ comedy abound in maxims, there are almost no maxims to 
be found in fifth-century comedy, apart from quotations or parodies from other 
literary sources.19 This seems to mark a significant development in the genre over 
time. Various explanations might be suggested, including the emergence of the 
epigram as a prominent literary form in the fourth century, or the growing interest in 
quotation culture and anthologies during the same period. But in large part this 
development may be due to the fact that fourth-century comedy was even more 
obsessed with tragedy and paratragedy than earlier comedy had been.20 In other 
words, because tragedy (especially Euripidean tragedy, a favourite source of humour) 
incorporates a huge number of maxims, so too did later comedy, in an attempt to 
become – or to seem – more ‘tragic’. It might be thought that comedy had suddenly 
grown up and become serious, taking on some of the ethical or didactic function 
traditionally ascribed to tragedy. But had comedy really changed so much in the space 
of a few decades? Perhaps not. 
A couple of comedians in particular, Epicharmus and Menander, have been 
seen as especially fond of maxims as a vehicle for pursuing serious ethical concerns. 
These two poets were writing at different periods and in very different contexts, but 
they pose similar problems. Their names came to be attached, by later writers and 
scholars, to large anthologies of moralizing maxims, but little if any of the content of 
these anthologies is authentic: they apparently consist of haphazard collections of 
 
19 I have identified only the following: Ar. Birds 451-2, Thesm. 198-9 
(quoting/parodying Agathon), 411-13 (quoting/parodying Euripides), Knights 88-94, 
fr. 976 (= Clem. Alex. Strom. 6.24.9, doubtfully assigned; may be from Epicurus); 
Chionides fr. 8 (= Vitruvius 6 pr. 3, doubtfully assigned: also attributed to Eupolis [fr. 
494], Crates [fr. 60], Aristophanes [fr. 924]); Cratinus fr. 28 (quoting a pre-existing 
logos), fr. 203 (discussed below); Eupolis fr. 366; Platon fr. 190; Metagenes fr. 19 
(parodying Homer); Theopompus fr. 35 (quoting/parodying Euripides). Arnott (2000) 
notes that Stobaeus, who frequently excerpts passages from fourth-century comedy, 
does not include gnomic material from old comedy. 
20 On tragedy and paratragedy in fourth-century comedy, see Gutzwiller (2000), 
Cusset (2003), Farmer (2017). 
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verses from a variety of authors, genres and periods.21 I ignore this problematic 
material here, preferring to focus exclusively on Athenian comedy and on maxims 
which can confidently be attributed to Menander’s plays. I shall return to Menander in 
more detail below, but it is worth observing here that his complete surviving texts, 
line for line, contain surprisingly few maxims. Given that many scholars have seen 
Menander as engaging seriously with Peripatetic thought, it is also important to note 
that his maxims are not especially interesting from an ethical or philosophical point of 
view. As David Bain has observed of Menander’s supposed moralizing purpose, ‘this 
was a case easier to sustain when all we had of him was fragmentary quotation’.22  
The fragmentary state of our sources means that we have to exercise caution 
when looking for patterns or drawing conclusions, but there are signs that other 
comedians may have been even more noteworthy than Menander in their use of 
maxims. The remains of Philemon, for instance, include many gnomic lines revealing 
a penchant for paradox, an unexpected avoidance of clichés, and a certain amount of 
original imagery, all of which features seem calculated to breathe new life into 
hackneyed themes: Philemon’s maxims may well have offered more food for thought 
than those of Menander.23 Several comedians from the earlier decades of the fourth 
century, such as Amphis, Alexis, Anaxandrides and Antiphanes, are particularly well 
represented by gnomic fragments, and Antiphanes even wrote an entire comedy called 
Paroimiai.24 This work is briefly mentioned by Athenaeus:  
 
21 See [Epicharmus] frs. 244-73 (cf. frs. 100, 214), with Olson (2007) 9-10, 52-63; on 
the Pseudepicharmeia in relation to the Sicilian dramatic tradition see Bosher (2014) 
85-88. On the Menandrou gnomai see Pompello (1997), Liapis (2002), Pernigotti 
(2008).  
22 Bain (1983) xix. 
23 See esp. Philemon, Ephebos fr. 28 (sailors are not the only people who are afflicted 
by storms), Pyrphoros fr. 75 (it is viewers, not artists, who create beauty in artworks), 
incert. fab. frs. 92 (poverty can be a desirable state of affairs), 97 (justice is not the 
same thing as avoiding crime), 119 (envy can be a good thing rather than an evil to be 
avoided), 148 (κακά can become ἀγαθά); cf. also unusual rhyming maxims at 
Epidikazomenos fr. 23 and incert. fab. fr. 135. 
24 Antiphanes frs. 186-7 (Athenaeus 2.60d-e); cf. Machon’s Chreiai, a third-century 
work which may or may not have been a comedy: see Kurke (2002). Note also a 
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ὅτι Κηφισόδωρος ὁ Ἰσοκράτους μαθητὴς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλους (τέσσαρα δ᾽ ἐστὶ 
ταῦτα βιβλία) ἐπιτιμᾶι τῶι φιλοσόφωι ὡς οὐ ποιήσαντι λόγου ἄξιον τὸ παροιμίας 
ἀθροῖσαι, Ἀντιφάνους ὅλον ποιήσαντος δρᾶμα τὸ ἐπιγραφόμενον Παροιμίαι. 
Cephisodorus, the pupil of Isocrates, in his Criticism of Aristotle (a work in four 
books), takes the philosopher to task for not having judged it worth while to collect 
proverbs, whereas Antiphanes wrote a whole play entitled Paroimiai. 
 
Almost nothing survives of this comedy, alas, but it evidently based its whole plot and 
conception on the idea of quotable maxims and proverbial wisdom. Its title suggests 
that the chorus members actually represented personified maxims – a witty physical 
embodiment of an abstract concept, for which parallels can be found in the Dissoi 
Logoi of Aristophanes’ Clouds or the letters of the alphabet in Callias’ Grammatike 
Tragoidia. It seems likely that Antiphanes’ play incorporated a significant metapoetic 
element, drawing special attention to the maxim as a topos or a source of humour in 
its own right. Here, if anywhere, maxims are being paraded before us wearing ironical 
inverted commas. 
So far, then, I have been outlining a general case for regarding the 
characteristically comic maxim as a ludic, distorted version of an ostensibly familiar 
form. It could be added that the comedians’ deployment of maxims is essentially 
metaliterary in purpose. They are drawing their audience’s attention (either implicitly 
or explicitly) to quotation culture and the habit of selective excerption; they are 
actively participating in quotation culture by the way in which they formulate certain 
verses so as to stand out as quotations even in their original setting; by inviting the 
audience to see all these maxims as appearing within ‘quotation marks’ they are 
challenging them to think about what this might mean in terms of interpretation; and 
they are obliquely using these maxims as a form of self-referential commentary on 
contemporary reading practices. The following sections develop this general case via 
discussion of specific examples. 
 
II. READING MAXIMS IN AND OUT OF CONTEXT 
 
curious dramatic work from seventeenth-century France – La comédie de proverbes – 
which may be similar to Antiphanes’ play in its conception: see Kramer (2003). 
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Dramatic maxims have a dual function and purpose: they are formulated so as to be 
readable either within a specific plot context or out of context as autonomous 
utterances. Sometimes there will have been a significant discrepancy or dissonance 
between these two levels of interpretation. The meaning of a maxim might be altered, 
enhanced or undercut in a variety of ways, depending on its precise situation and 
timing within a play’s plot, or on the identity and status of the speaker. It seems to me 
that comedy, considerably more than tragedy, typically exploits this sort of 
dissonance to create a pervasive sense of irony or inconsistency.25  
To take a single, telling example: the well-known Menandrean one-liner ὃν οἱ 
θεοὶ φιλοῦσιν, ἀποθνήισκει νέος (‘He whom the gods love dies young’). If treated out 
of context as a self-contained utterance, this lends itself to being read as a poignant 
generalization about promising lives cut short. Indeed, it became famous, in both 
ancient and modern times, as an autonomous maxim: it was repeatedly quoted or 
paraphrased by such writers as George Herbert, Lord Byron, and Oscar Wilde,26 and 
it has been described as ‘the expression of a refined, thoughtful, and very sympathetic 
mind, touched with melancholy but remarkably free from passion or sensuality’.27 
Nevertheless, the verse evidently made a rather different impression in its original 
dramatic setting, where it was not a lament for doomed youth but a sarcastic insult 
directed at an old man by a cheeky slave. The play Dis Exapaton survives only in 
woefully fragmentary form, but we have Plautus’ Latin adaptation of the scene in 
question (Bacchides 816-21): 
 
   quem di diligunt 
 
25 Tragic maxims can also be read in or out of context, but any resulting dissonance 
tends to be less radically ironical: see e.g. Lardinois (2006).  
26 Menander, Dis Exapaton fr. 4 K-A (125K), quoted in antiquity by Stobaeus 
4.52b.27, [Plut.] Consol. Ad Apoll. 119e, Clem. Alex. Strom. 6.2 and others (see PCG 
ad loc.). On the verse’s modern incarnation(s) see Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs6 
(Oxford, 2015) 130; cf. G. Herbert, Jacula Prudentum 1094, Byron, Don Juan IV.xii; 
Wilde reworked the line as ‘those whom the gods love grow young’ and ‘those whom 
the gods hate die old’: see Wilde (2007) 166-7. On this and other Menandrean 
maxims that circulated in decontextualized form cf. Nervegna (2013) 207-8. 
27 Powell and Barber (1929) 9. 
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adulescens moritur, dum valet, sentit, sapit. 
hunc si ullus deus amaret, plus annis decem, 
plus iam viginti mortuom esse oportuit. 
terrai <iam> odium ambulat, iam nil sapit 
nec sentit, tantist quantist fungus putidus. 
(Chrysalus:) He whom the gods love dies young, while he still has his health, sense, 
and wits. This fellow here, if the gods had loved him, ought to have died more than ten 
– no, more than twenty – years ago, but as it is, he’s still walking around as a blight on 
the earth, he’s lost his wits and his senses, and he’s about as much use as a mouldy 
mushroom. 
 
In this instance the undercutting effect created by the context and speaker is 
particularly marked; but no doubt the same sort of dissonance between generalizing 
maxim and specific context was, in varying degrees, frequent throughout comedy. 
In all but a few cases we can read these maxims only in their 
decontextualized/fragmentary form. However, the few complete or partially preserved 
plays of Menander offer us an opportunity to compare and contrast the function of 
maxims in and out of context.28 It is hard to generalize on the basis of such a small 
sample, but a few interesting tendencies emerge. First of all, and most strikingly, the 
effect created by maxims within a particular scenario tends to be much less definitive 
or less confident than the effect of their decontextualized equivalents. These 
supposedly universal statements of wisdom and truth are uttered in a way that makes 
them come across as tentative or provisional. Often the speakers seem to be using 
maxims in an attempt to persuade others to see things their way when the truth of a 
situation is in doubt, or in an attempt to bolster up their own authority and status when 
they are under threat in some way, or in a spirit of self-consolation when the events 
going on around them seem chaotic or terrible.29 It is almost as if these characters are 
hoping that the very act of stating these ‘truths’ could make them true. The second 
notable tendency is that maxims are often uttered by the ‘wrong’ people – young, 
 
28 See Cusset and Lhostis (2011), with reference to Dyskolos, Samia and Aspis. 
29 E.g. Aspis 189-93; Dyskolos 129-31, 271-87, 767-71, 789-90, 860-5; Samia 140-3, 
163-5, 206-9, 340-2. 
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foolish, immoral or servile characters – rather than by their older, wiser, loftier 
counterparts.30 Again, this undermines the authority of the words uttered.  
We might have expected to find some contrast between the maxims dished up 
during the earlier part of a play (when everyone is stumbling about in confusion and 
error) and those offered towards the end of a play (when it is finally clear what has 
been happening, and some sort of moral lesson might reasonably be drawn from the 
events). But there is not a single example of this sort of effect in the surviving plays. 
Curiously, Menander’s characters avoid maxims at just the point at which they have 
acquired greater knowledge and understanding. It is also surprising that they do not 
utter maxims towards the end of speeches or scenes, even though this was a common 
enough structural technique elsewhere. All of this implies that none of the maxims is 
to be accorded any more weight or emphasis than any other, and it may be thought to 
add to the overall sense of inconclusiveness. 
 Let us examine the maxims in one particular play – the Epitrepontes – as a 
way of illustrating these tendencies.31 The first, on the subject of idleness, appears 
towards the start of Act II. The papyrus text is badly damaged at this point, but the 
maxim can be completely restored because it was also preserved as an independent 
quotation/fragment by the anthologizer Stobaeus.32  
 
ἀργὸς δ' ὑγιαίνων τοῦ πυρέττοντος πολύ 
ἐστ' ἀθλιώτερος· διπλάσιά γ' ἐσθίει 
μάτην· ἰδεῖν βουλήσομ' αὐ[τὸν 
An idle man in good health is much more of a wretch than one who’s suffering from a 
fever, since he eats twice as much but to no avail. I’ll see him if I get my way... 
 
30 Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1395a2-7 for the view that γνωμολογεῖν is more appropriate for 
older speakers. 
31 I omit from the discussion two book fragments (frr. 1-2 Sandbach = Orion, Anth. 
7.8, Stobaeus 4.29.58) which cannot be placed within the plot of the play as it stands; 
but see Ireland (2010) 261-2. 
32 P.Oxy. 4641 (overlapping with the book-fragment preserved at Stobaeus 3.30.7): 
see Nünlist (1999). Cf. also Furley (2009) 139-41, who prints the lines as ‘Act II, 12-
15’; Ireland’s text (2010) numbers them as lines 207-9. (Sandbach had previously 
included the lines as ‘fr. 6’.) 
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The speaker is the old miser Smikrines. At this point in the plot he is complaining 
about the behaviour of his good-for-nothing son-in-law, Charisios, who has 
abandoned his wife and gone next door to live an life of idleness and debauchery. 
Smikrines invokes the maxim as a way of criticizing Charisios’ behaviour by 
reference to general principles, which is perfectly reasonable. But his choice of 
maxim also characterizes Smikrines himself, for it is particularly amusing to see a 
miser worrying about someone over-indulging at another person’s expense. In fact 
Smikrines has already complained about Charisios’ wine-drinking, not so much 
because of his drunkenness but specifically because of the cost of the wine (127-31), 
and he has also expressed horror at the fees charged by Charisios’ pimp (136-7; cf. 
749-50 on the expenses involved in festival attendance). In other words, what is 
presented by the speaker as a general moral observation about idleness is inherently 
mixed up with the specifics of the situation and the character of the speaker. In 
addition to the primary subject-matter, there is also an implicit secondary subject 
(penny-pinching), and the moral arbiter himself unwittingly becomes a target of 
criticism. 
 The character of the speaker is also an important factor in the next example 
(232-6). Here the charcoal-burner Syriskos is attempting to persuade Smikrines to act 
as impartial arbiter in his dispute with the shepherd Daos. 
 
μὴ καταφρονήσηις, πρὸς θεῶν. ἐν παντὶ δεῖ 
καιρῶι τὸ δίκαιον ἐπικρατεῖν ἁπανταχοῦ, 
καὶ τὸν παρατυγχάνοντα τούτου τοῦ μέρους 
ἔχειν πρόνοιαν· κοινόν ἐστι τῶι βίωι 
πάντων. 
Don’t look down on us, I beseech you. At all times, everywhere in the world, justice 
should prevail, and anyone who happens to be present should feel that they are 
involved: it is a duty common to everyone in this life. 
 
As Daos immediately interjects, μετρίωι γε συμπέπληγμαι ῥήτορι – ‘I’ve got myself 
involved with a right proper orator!’ – and indeed, as others have observed, it seems 
incongruous that Syriskos, an uneducated slave, should be presented as so acutely 
clever and so familiar with rhetorical techniques during this whole scene. Here the 
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maxim is employed for persuasive ends, but it is the second half of the statement that 
is particularly striking. The speaker is really squeezing two separate points into a 
single maxim, starting off with an unexceptional and rather vague appeal to justice (τὸ 
δίκαιον) but expanding this basic point into a more controversial claim about ‘moral 
proximity’ or the duties of the bystander.33 What is even more important is that 
Syriskos is transparently motivated by considerations of self-interest rather than, as he 
claims, by a concern for universal justice. He is really using the maxim as a cover for 
his own distinctly questionable conduct. The subject of the dispute is a collection of 
jewellery and ornaments that were abandoned along with the baby whom Daos found 
and whom Syriskos and his wife adopted, and the point is that Syriskos wants to keep 
these precious objects for himself. 
 A little later, Syriskos uses another maxim in his attempts to get hold of the 
trinkets. This time his argument is both ingenious and ludicrous. He now affects to 
believe that he and all the others are characters in a tragedy, and he points out (325ff.) 
that tragedies are full of stories of abandoned babies, long-lost relatives and 
recognition-scenes, in which tokens are vital to the resolution of the plot. In that case, 
Syriskos argues, it would be unfair to deprive this baby of a proper recognition-scene 
and its hope of deliverance and social prospects. It is precisely in this context that he 
deploys the next maxim (341-5): 
 
γαμῶν ἀδελφήν τις διὰ γνωρίσματα 
ἐπέσχε, μητέρ' ἐντυχὼν ἐρρύσατο, 
ἔσωσ' ἀδελφόν. ὄντ' ἐπισφαλῆ φύσει 
τὸν βίον ἁπάντων τῆι προνοίαι δεῖ, πάτερ, 
τηρεῖν, πρὸ πολλοῦ ταῦθ' ὁρῶντ' ἐξ ὧν ἔνι. 
It was through recognition-tokens that one man refrained from marrying his sister, and 
another was reunited with his mother and rescued her, and another saved his brother. 
By nature the life of all people is precarious, good sir, so one must look after it with 
due foresight, with a view to how we might get the result we want above all else. 
 
33 Cf. the famous Terentian maxim homo sum: humani nihil alienum a me puto 
(Heaut. Tim. 77), which similarly appears to encapsulate the principle of ‘moral 
proximity’ (cf. Cic. De Off. 1.30, Sen. Epist. 95.52-3), but is actually an attempt by 
Chremes to justify poking his nose into other people’s business. 
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As before, what starts off as an unremarkable general observation – on the precarious 
nature of human life – is developed into a more complex proposition about foresight 
and the need to look after one’s own interests.34 But this time the sentiment is 
undercut by the overt intrusion of metatheatricality and paratragedy.35 It is openly 
acknowledged that the scenario is not real life but a play, with strong generic affinities 
to tragedy (even though we are still in a comedy); the precious objects have become 
dramatic props or ‘recognition-tokens’ (γνωρίσματα), as if Syriskos already knows 
that there is a recognition-scene coming up in the next act; and the maxim itself might 
be seen as paratragic in its language and tone.36 Several sets of ‘inverted commas’ are 
simultaneously in play here, and thus it is hard to read the content of the maxim 
unironically. 
 Syriskos is not the only character to behave as though he is in a play, nor is he 
the only one to use maxims in a paratragic manner. An even more striking example is 
provided by the slave Onesimus, who quotes a genuine tragic maxim towards the end 
of Act V (1123-6) when he is trying to explain the plot to Smikrines: 
 
 ἡ φύσις ἐβούλεθ', ἧι νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει· 
γυνὴ δ' ἐπ' αὐτῶι τῶιδ' ἔφυ. τί μῶρος εἶ; 
τραγικὴν ἐρῶ σοι ῥῆσιν ἐξ Αὔγης ὅλην 
ἂν μή ποτ' αἴσθηι. 
 
34 There is also a degree of ambiguity: should one take the words ἁπάντων τῆι 
προνοίαι together, meaning ‘foresight of everything’? To what does ταῦθ' refer? See 
Verdenius (1974).  
35 On the use of paratragic motifs here (and elsewhere in Menander) see Cusset 
(2003) 183-7; Gutzwiller (2000) 105-6, 111-13. 
36 Metrically and in its expression the maxim seems more tragic than comic: its 
language is ‘elaborately turned’ and includes the ‘high’ (epic or tragic) form 
ἐρρύσατο: see Gomme and Sandbach (1973) 316-7. The commentators add that in 
general throughout this scene ‘Syriskos’ style keeps rising towards that of 
tragedy...but never quite maintains the tragic level;... when he thinks of the real world, 
comic metre comes rushing back.’ 
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‘It was the will of nature, which cares nothing for laws; woman was born for this very 
thing’.37 How can you be so foolish? I’ll quote you the whole tragic speech from Auge, 
if you haven’t grasped it by now!  
 
The function of this quotation is much the same as Syriskos’ earlier remarks about the 
parallels between the current situation and the world of tragedy. We are being 
reminded, none too subtly, that the plot of Epitrepontes is uncannily similar to that of 
Euripides’ Auge (in which Auge was raped by Heracles and gave birth to a child who 
was later recognized by means of a ring). In this case the specifically gnomic 
properties of the quotation are almost irrelevant; it is the literary genre and the 
specific source of the verses that we are supposed to notice, rather than the fact that 
this is a maxim. We may also notice the fact that Onesimus, like Syriskos, although a 
slave, is conversant with literature and able to conjure up an apt quotation for every 
occasion. As often, it is the ‘wrong’ character who acts as the voice of knowledge and 
wisdom, while those of superior status and education are seen as helpless fools. A few 
lines earlier Onesimus had already demonstrated a certain moral authority by 
supplying Smikrines with another maxim about the importance of a man’s inner 
character (1092-9): 
 
οὐκ ἆρα φρον[τί]ζουσιν ἡμῶν [ο]ἱ θεοί; 
φήσεις. ἑκάστωι τὸν τρόπον συν[ώικισαν 
φρούραρχον· οὗτος ἔνδο[ν] ἐπ[ιτεταγμένος  
ἐπέτριψεν, ἂν αὐτῶι κακῶς χρη[σώμεθα, 
ἕτερον δ' ἔσωσεν. οὗτός ἐσθ' ἡμῖν θεὸς  
ὅ τ' αἴτιος καὶ τοῦ καλῶς καὶ τοῦ κακῶς 
πράττειν ἑκάστωι· τοῦτον ἱλάσκου ποῶν 
μηδὲν ἄτοπον μηδ' ἀμαθές, ἵνα πράττηις καλῶς. 
Will you say, then, that the gods don’t care for us? But they’ve placed our character to 
dwell in each of us as our commander: once it has been assigned to its post within us, it 
brings us down if we mistreat it, but in another case it might bring salvation. Character 
is our god, and it is responsible for each person’s fate, both good and ill. If you want to 
fare well, you must please it by not doing anything inappropriate or foolish. 
 
 
37 Eur. Auge fr. 920 Kannicht. 
 18 
More than any of the other maxims in the play, this may seem to invite us to read it 
completely ‘straight’. It has been interpreted as a variant on the concept of the 
guardian daimon or guiding spirit, found in other (perfectly serious) philosophical 
writings.38 Yet here too it appears that the sentiments expressed in the maxim are 
being undermined, either by their incongruous appearance in the mouth of a comic 
slave, or by a certain logical inconsistency (if our character is responsible for our 
actions, how can we choose to ‘please’ it by our own choice of actions?), or by the 
fact that with this theory Onesimos is controversially rejecting the gods and 
conventional religious wisdom (cf. 1081-9). In addition, one notes that the deliberate 
mangling or oversimplification of philosophical concepts seems to have been a 
recurrent topos of comic maxims: one can identify many similar examples from other 
comedies, which typically reject serious philosophy in favour of homely popular 
wisdom.39 
 The only other maxim in the play (793-6) is spoken by Smikrines to his 
daughter, Pamphile, when he is warning her that she is in danger of being displaced in 
her husband’s affections by a courtesan:  
 
      χαλεπόν, Παμφίλη, 
ἐλευθέραι γυναικὶ πρὸς πόρνην μάχη. 
πλείονα πανουργεῖ, πλείον' οἶδ', αἰσχύνεται 
οὐδέν, κολακεύει μᾶλλον, αἰσχρῶν [ἅπτεται. 
 
38 Ireland (2010) 258 compares Heraclitus fr. 119 D-K, Epicharmus fr. 266 K-A and 
Seneca Epist. 41.2 as well as Menander fr. 500 K-A, though he concludes that this is 
‘essentially a mishmash of ideas from a slave’. Cf. Gomme and Sandbach (1973) 378: 
‘Onesimos’ philosophy here will not stand up’. 
39 e.g. Alexis, Asotodidaskalos fr. 25 (reduction of Epicureanism to simple hedonism); 
Baton, Androphonos fr. 3, Philemon, Pyrrhus fr. 74 (ridicule of ‘the Good’); 
Theognetus, Phasma fr. 1 (Stoic concepts reduced to λογαρία, i.e. ‘little soundbites’). 
Cf. Arist. Rhet. 2.1395a6-7 and fr. 13 Rose for the idea that philosophers rejected the 
popular gnomic tradition and, conversely, that maxims are the property of ordinary 
people. See also Dover (1974) 269. 
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It is difficult, Pamphile, for a free-born woman to join battle with a whore: she is 
capable of more mischief; she knows more; she has no shame; she is better at flattery; 
she behaves disgracefully. 
 
As frequently elsewhere, the maxim is being employed as a tool for persuasion. This 
particular example, like the last, initially seems straightforward and unproblematic: it 
presents itself as an expression of a conventional misogynistic topos (and it was 
treated as such by the fourth-century bishop who later quoted the lines out of 
context).40 But in fact – like all the other maxims in this play – its literal value as a 
statement of universal wisdom is undermined by the development of the plot, for we 
will shortly see that Habrotonon, the ‘whore’ in question, is a thoroughly good and 
sympathetic character. She is kind and supportive to Pamphile, she is instrumental in 
bringing about the reconciliation between Pamphile and Charisios, and she is 
generally quite unlike the stereotypical scarlet woman that we might have expected.41 
Thus Smikrines’ conventional wisdom is revealed as completely inadequate to deal 
with the situation. 
It would be unsafe to regard Epitrepontes as typical of the whole comic genre 
in its use of maxims; other lost plays and different authors may have handled things 
very differently.42 Nonetheless, it is highly suggestive that the apparent meaning of 
every single maxim in this play is modified, undermined or ironized by its dramatic 
setting.  
 
III. WINE AND ‘WISDOM’ 
 
40 Palladius, Dialogue on the Life of Chrysostom §94. Furley (2009) compares 
Menander fr. 860; many other comic and tragic maxims depict women as cunning and 
devious. 
41 See Ruffell (2014) 156-9 on Menander’s subtle and unconventional deployment of 
‘stock’ characters, including Habrotonon; cf. Hurst (2015) 24-7 and Arnott (1979) 
xxxii-xxxviii. 
42 Nevertheless, Cusset and Lhostis (2011) reach similar conclusions in relation to 
Dyskolos, Samia and Aspis. 
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As I observed above, comic maxims range widely across the subject matter of Greek 
popular morality, but one topic in particular – wine – is especially well represented.43 
No doubt this partly reflects the fact that many of our fragments come from 
Athenaeus. But it is also unsurprising in view of the thematic preoccupations of the 
genre. After all, many comedies, from all periods, feature a pronounced sympotic or 
komastic element, and there is much talk of drinking and getting drunk.44  
 Gnomic wisdom relating to wine is not exclusively the property of comedy – it 
can be found in Homeric epic, lyric poetry and sympotic elegy – but comedy 
transforms the theme in an idiosyncratic way. Sometimes we might find comedians 
explicitly challenging traditional ideas from the world of the symposium, as in a 
passage from Anaxandrides (Thesauros fr. 18) where a character rejects (or revises) 
the proverbial content of an old drinking-song:  
 
ὁ τὸ σκόλιον εὑρὼν ἐκεῖνος, ὅστις ἦν, 
τὸ μὲν ὑγιαίνειν πρῶτον ὡς ἄριστον ὂν 
ὠνόμασεν ὀρθῶς· δεύτερον δ᾽ εἶναι καλόν, 
τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν, τοῦθ᾽, ὁρᾶις, ἐμαίνετο. 
μετὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν γὰρ τὸ πλουτεῖν διαφέρει· 
καλὸς δὲ πεινῶν ἐστιν αἰσχρὸν θηρίον. 
That fellow who came up with the skolion, whoever it was, he really put his finger on it 
when he said that the first and best thing was for a person to be healthy. But as for 
claiming that the second best thing was to be good-looking and the third best to be rich 
– well, you see, in that respect he was insane! No, after health it’s being rich that stands 
out as next best; and a hungry man who happens to be good-looking is still a terrible 
creature.45 
 
43 Alexis frs. 45, 82, 88, 257, 273, 280; Amphis frs. 8, 29, 33, 37, 41; Antiphanes frs. 
42, 228, 232, 238, 250, 268; Aristophanes Knights 88; Axionicus fr. 5; Clearchus fr. 
3; Cratinus fr. 203; Crobylus fr. 3; Ephippus fr. 25; Eubulus frs. 93, 133; Menander 
Samia 340-4, Ophelion fr. 4 [= Eubulus fr. 33]; Philemon frs. 104, 162. 
44 On the genre’s vinous leanings see Bowie (1997), Pütz (2003), Wilkins (2000) 202-
13. 
45 Cf. PMG 890 (also Pl. Gorg. 451e, Arist. Rhet. 2.21.1394b13, Athen. 15.694e) for 
the original skolion, which Aristotle (Rhet. 2.21.1394b13) treats as conventionally 
accepted opinion (φαίνεται γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς οὕτω). Cf. also Menander, Hymnis fr. 
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But more often what we see in comedy is a series of playful bons mots formulated 
from the viewpoint of the bon viveur. Wine is repeatedly presented as a vital 
component of human existence: it boosts the intellect; it gives one special abilities 
that one did not possess before; it improves one’s conversation; it is akin to poetic 
inspiration; its effect on the drinker is compared to the watering of a plant.46 Above 
all, however, it is alcoholic excess, rather than moderation and good sense, that is 
recommended in these maxims – as in the following example (Amphis, Philadelphoi 
fr. 33): 
 
κατὰ πόλλ᾽ ἐπαινῶ μᾶλλον ἡμῶν τὸν βίον 
τὸν τῶν φιλοποτῶν ἤπερ ὑμῶν τῶν μόνον 
ἐν τῶι μετώπωι νοῦν ἔχειν εἰωθότων. 
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ συντετάχθαι διὰ τέλους 
φρόνησις οὖσα διὰ τὸ λεπτῶς καὶ πυκνῶς 
πάντ᾽ ἐξετάζειν δέδιεν ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα 
ὁρμᾶν προχείρως, ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ σαφῶς 
τί ποτ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστου πράγματος συμβήσεται 
διαλελογίσθαι δρᾶι τι καὶ νεανικὸν 
καὶ θερμόν... 
There are many reasons why I want to praise the life of us bibulous folk, in preference 
to your life, you whose heads are wont to contain nothing but sober sense. Why, your 
way of thinking, being disposed to examine everything thoroughly and carefully, is 
afraid to go with its impulse and rush into things; but our way of doing things, on the 
other hand, because it doesn’t calculate the precise outcome of every eventuality, can 
achieve something fresh and spirited... 
 
 
362 (a proverb is quoted within a longer maxim, and the speaker distances himself 
from the sentiment of the original proverb); Ephippus fr. 25 also seems to be arguing 
with the proverb οἶνος καὶ ἀλάθεα (Alcaeus fr. 366; cf. Pl. Symp. 217e3-4, Theocritus 
29.1-8). 
46 e.g. Ephippus fr. 25, Cratinus, Pytine fr. 203, Amphis fr. 41, Alexis fr. 285, Ar. 
Knights 88. 
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Here, as so often, the maxim is being used in order to persuade or exhort the listener, 
but the speaker is a drunkard and his interlocutor is a sober, sensible character. This is 
obviously another variation on the familiar comic pattern of maxims appearing in the 
mouths of the ‘wrong’ people. Can one take the advice of inebriated people entirely 
seriously? 
Occasionally, it is true, the dangers of strong drink are acknowledged, as in 
the maxim πολὺς γὰρ οἶνος πόλλ᾽ ἁμαρτάνειν ποεῖ – ‘A lot of wine leads to a lot of 
mistakes’ (Alexis, Epitropos fr. 82). In fact, overindulgence and its after-effects seem 
to have provided a stock theme, as illustrated by the following nearly identical 
maxims from different authors: 
  
εἰ τοῖς μεθυσκομένοις ἑκάστης ἡμέρας 
ἀλγεῖν συνέβαινε τὴν κεφαλὴν πρὸ τοῦ πιεῖν 
τὸν ἄκρατον, ἡμῶν οὐδὲ εἷς ἔπινεν ἄν· 
νῦν δὲ πρότερον γε τοῦ πόνον τὴν ἡδονὴν 
προλαμβάνοντες ὑστεροῦμεν τἀγαθοῦ. 
If people who get drunk every day suffered their hangover before drinking unmixed 
wine, not a single one of us would ever have had a drink. But as it is, we enjoy the 
pleasure before the pain, and so we miss out on what’s good for us (Clearchus, 
Corinthioi fr. 3). 
 
εἰ τοῦ μεθύσκεναι πρότερον τὸ κραιπαλᾶν 
παρεγίγνεθ᾽ ἡμῖν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς οἶνον ποτε 
προσίετο πλείω τοῦ μετρίου· νυνὶ δὲ τὴν 
τιμωρίαν οὐ προσδοκῶντες τῆς μέθης 
ἥξειν προχείρως τοὺς ἀκράτους πίνομεν. 
If we suffered the hangover before getting drunk, not a single one of us would ever 
drink more than his recommended limit of wine. But as it is, we don’t expect to get 
punished for being drunk, and so we eagerly guzzle down the unmixed wine (Alexis, 
Phrygian fr. 257). 
 
Lines like this are funny because almost everyone can relate to them from personal 
experience – and, of course, the hangover has proved a mainstay of humour for 
comedians throughout the centuries, from Cratinus to Lucky Jim – but it can scarcely 
be said that maxims of this sort represent ‘traditional wisdom’ in the way that we 
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would normally expect. In this category of maxims if nowhere else, it is obvious that 
the comedians are playing around with the traditional form, using it as a vehicle for 
unorthodox content. The sentiments in question appear (once again) inside ironical 




IV. COMIC VERSUS TRAGIC WISDOM 
I have suggested that the maxim may be treated as a literary genre with which comedy 
is in dialogue. But another genre – tragedy – is arguably even more significant as a 
point of reference or departure. As we have already seen, tragedy was routinely 
treated as a genuinely authoritative source of wisdom and a repository of maxims. 
One of the most interesting categories of comic maxims consists of verses in which 
the comedians are openly engaging in dialogue with tragic maxims by explicitly 
quoting, adapting or parodying specific tragic sources. In these examples, perhaps, we 
are witnessing not just a dialogue but a contest of comic versus tragic wisdom.47  
 A number of comic maxims are created by taking well-known tragic maxims 
and altering some aspect of them so that they become preposterous. For example, the 
Sophoclean maxim ὅρκους ἐγὼ γυναικὸς εἰς ὕδωρ γράφω (‘I write down the oaths of 
a woman on water’, fr. 811 Radt) in its comic incarnation becomes ὅρκον δ᾽ ἐγὼ 
γυναικὸς εἰς οἶνον γράφω (‘I write down the oath of a woman in wine’, Xenarchus, 
Pentathlos fr. 6). Xenarchus has retained the traditional form, the quotationality, and 
the authoritative tone of the original, but he has tweaked the content to provide an 
unexpected punchline. Of course, turning water into wine is thoroughly in keeping 
with the jocular, boozy moralizing that characterizes the genre (see above), and thus 
the maxim has now become distinctively comic. The comedian has ‘improved’ 
tragedy, rewriting it in a way that is more in keeping with his own generic 
preoccupations.  
Xenarchus’ humour depends on the fact that the Sophoclean maxim was 
already current as a famous quotation and would have been recognized as such by his 
 
47 Cf. Mauduit (2011), who shows that Aristophanes treats maxims as one among a 
number of tragic conventions which he seeks to criticize; Wright (2012) 150-6 makes 
a similar point about gnomic citations from tragedy in old comedy. 
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audience. A similar effect is seen elsewhere, as in the opening (fr. 1) of Eriphus’ lost 
comedy Aeolus, the title of which suggests a sustained interest in tragic parody. 
 
λόγος γάρ ἐστ᾽ ἀρχαῖος οὐ κακῶς ἔχων· 
οἶνον λέγουσι τοὺς γέροντας, ὦ πάτερ, 
πείθειν χορεύειν οὐ θέλοντας 
There is an ancient saying, which isn’t at all bad: they say, father, that wine persuades 
old men to dance, even if they don’t want to… 
 
Here the maxim is explicitly framed as a quotation (logos) from some other source, 
and the speaker is apparently vouching for its authority, although the litotes (οὐ 
κακῶς ἔχων) seems to hint that his tone is somewhat tongue-in-cheek even before the 
saying has been quoted. In fact Eriphus is parodying Sophocles, not in the content of 
the maxim but in the way that the maxim is introduced. Eriphus is drawing our 
attention to the fact that it was unusual and striking for a play to begin with a maxim, 
as the source text, Sophocles’ Trachiniae, had done.48 The first lines of this tragedy, 
spoken by Deianeira, are: 
 
λόγος γάρ ἐστ᾽ ἀρχαῖος ἀνθρώπων φανείς, 
ὡς οὐκ ἂν αἰῶν᾽ ἐκμάθοις βροτῶν, πρὶν ἂν 
θάνηι τις, οὔτ᾽ εἰ χρηστὸς οὔτ᾽ εἴ τωι κακός. 
There is an ancient saying, well known to mankind, that you cannot rightly assess a 
person’s life, so as to know whether it is good or bad, before it comes to its end. 
 
These words, boldly positioned right at the start of the prologue, look remarkably like 
an epigraph in terms of their interpretative function and their relationship to the rest of 
the tragedy. They are ostensibly programmatic, suggesting that they are (somehow) 
thematically important for understanding the drama that follows, but at the same time 
they are provocative and challenging, inviting disagreement or debate.49 Even in the 
original version, the maxim is already a quotation, and its speaker explicitly distances 
 
48 Soph. Trach. 1-3; the only other surviving examples of this technique are Eur. 
Aeolus fr. 13a, Hcld. 1-6, Or. 1-3, Phoenix fr. 803a, Stheneboea fr. 661. 
49 See Wright (2016) on quasi-epigraphic lines. 
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herself from the utterance. Deianeira attributes it to other people (or to an anonymous 
voice of tradition), and she goes on to say that her own personal experiences make her 
doubt the truth of the saying. In Eriphus’ comic version nothing remains of the 
original maxim except, as it were, the quotation marks. The comedian is drawing our 
attention not to the meaning of the Sophoclean maxim but specifically to its function 
and form (as a provocative opening device and as an example of the complexity of 
quotation culture). The specific content is new. As in the previous example, sober 
tragic moralizing has been replaced by tipsy comic wisdom (or rather, ‘wisdom’ – in 
inverted commas). 
 Elsewhere Antiphanes (fr. 228) riffs on another Sophoclean theme, mixing 
together a well-known quotation from Antigone with a gnomic pronouncement of his 
own on the meaning of life: 
 
τὸ δὲ ζῆν, εἰπέ μοι, 
τί ἐστι; <     > τὸ πίνειν φῆμ᾽ ἐγώ. 
ὁραῖς παρὰ ῥείθροισι χειμάρροις ὅσα 
δένδρων ἀεὶ τὴν νύκτα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν 
βρέχεται, μέγεθος καὶ κάλλος οἷα γίγνεται, 
τὰ δ᾽ ἀντιτείνοντ᾽ οἱονεὶ δίψαν τινὰ 
ἢ ξηρασίαν ἔχοντ᾽ αὐτόπρεμν᾽ ἀπόλλυται. 
Life! – what is it, pray tell? Life is drinking, say I. Do you see how the trees beside 
fast-flowing torrent streams stay well-watered at all times of the day and night, and 
how tall and attractive they grow, but those that resist, those that are dry and parched, 
are destroyed root and branch... 
 
The comic and tragic verses are run together as if they formed a single utterance.50 In 
fact the Sophoclean lines (Ant. 712-15) are not strictly gnomic, but they contain a 
 
50 For the same cut-and-paste technique cf. Menander fr. 602 K-A and incert. fab. fr. 4 
Sandbach, both of which passages incorporate Euripidean material alongside 
Menander’s own words in the service of consolation or gnomic advice. Plut. Consol. 
ad Apoll. 5, 103b, who preserves the quotation, apparently treats both authors side by 
side as sources of ethical wisdom. Cf. also Antiphanes, Traumatias fr. 205, which 
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simile that obviously struck readers as vivid and memorable. Antiphanes is not the 
only comedian to make use of the quotation: not long after its original appearance it 
was already being parodied by Eupolis.51 As often in comedy, half the fun lies in 
quotation-spotting.52 Any spectator or reader familiar with Antigone would have been 
aware that the quotation originally belonged to a speech by Haemon, in which he 
vainly tried to persuade his father to be less obdurate, but in its new context the lines 
are manipulated so as to produce a quite different meaning. The streams and torrents 
of the Sophoclean simile are treated as if they literally represented streams of wine, 
and the image is used to illustrate the ‘truth’ that life and wine are synonymous. Thus 
the boundaries between quotation and original, tragedy and comedy, serious and silly, 
are blurred. Perhaps Antiphanes might also be seen as using this maxim to draw our 
attention implicitly to the problems of excerption as a reading practice, highlighting 
the way in which readers tend to take quotations out of context and distort them for 
their own ends. 
 The contrast between selective excerption and complete sequential reading of 
texts was made fully explicit in a scene of dialogue in Diphilus’ Synoris (fr. 74).  
 
    (Α.) οὐκ ἄν ποτε 
Εὐριπίδης γυναῖκα σώσει· οὐχ ὁρᾶις 
ἐν ταῖς τραγωιδίαισιν αὐτὰς ὡς στυγεῖ; 
τοὺς δὲ παρασίτους ἠγάπα· λέγει γέ τοι 
‘ἀνὴρ μὲν ὅστις εὖ βίον κεκτημένος 
μὴ τοὐλάχιστον τρεῖς ἀσυμβόλους τρέφει, 
ὄλοιτο νόστου μήποτ᾽ εἰς πάτραν τυχών.’ 
(Β.) πόθεν ἐστὶ ταῦτα, πρὸς θεῶν; 
        (Α.) τί δέ σοι μέλει; 
οὐ γὰρ τὸ δρᾶμα, τὸν δὲ νοῦν σκοπούμεθα. 
(A.) Euripides would never save a woman: don’t you see how he hates them in his 
tragedies? However, he really likes parasites! Why, indeed, he says: ‘The man who is 
in possession of a good livelihood but doesn’t feed at least three folk who can’t pay 
 
includes a paraphrase of a Euripidean maxim (Or. 234, μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ) 
within Antiphanes’ own sentence structure. 
51 Eupolis fr. 260. 23-6: see Storey (2003) 233-8. 
52 See Wright (2012) 143-62. 
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their own way, let him perish on his journey home and never manage to get back to his 
native land.’ 
(B.) Where the hell are those lines from? 
(A.) What is it to you where they’re from? We’re not looking at the play but at the 
sense. 
 
The maxim is being used specifically to illustrate the contrast between these two 
different modes of reading. The person doing the quoting is a parasite, who is 
appropriating the quotation for his own ends (which, as usual, involve persuasion or 
manipulation). He is not concerned with Euripides’ original meaning, whatever that 
may have been. Once again, the joke here works by mobilizing the audience’s 
knowledge of literature. Those who were well-read in tragedy will have realized, 
firstly, that the source of the quotation was Euripides’ Antiope, and secondly, that the 
parasite has deliberately altered the quotation to suit his own interests. The original 
lines were as follows: 
 
ἀνὴρ γὰρ ὅστις εὖ βίον κεκτημένος 
τὰ μὲν κατ᾽ οἴκους ἀμελίαι παρεὶς ἐᾶι, 
μολπαῖσι δ᾽ ἡσθεὶς τοῦτ᾽ ἀεὶ θηρευέται, 
ἀργὸς μὲν οἴκοι κἂν πόλει γενήσεται, 
φίλοισι δ᾽ οὐδείς· ἡ φύσις γὰρ οἴχεται, 
ὅταν γλυκείας ἡδονῆς ἥσσων τις ἦι.  
The man who is in possession of a good livelihood but ignores matters in his house and 
neglects them, delighting in musical activities and constantly pursuing them instead, 
will become idle both at home and in the city, and to his friends and family he will 
cease to exist – for a person’s nature is lost whenever he is overcome by sweet 
pleasure.53 
 
Those who recognized this quotation may have remembered that it formed part of the 
character Zethus’ strictures against idleness and self-indulgence. If so, they will have 
 
53 Eur. Antiope fr. 187 Kannicht (preserved by Stobaeus 3.30.1). On the clash between 
Zethus and Amphion, and the ‘sophistic’ concerns that formed the basis for Antiope’s 
plot, see Collard and Cropp (2005) 259-329. Both brothers tend to articulate their 
(diametrically opposed) views in the form of maxims: see esp. frs. 183-9, 193-8. 
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found it hilariously incongruous that an idle parasite should be quoting the lines out of 
context in support of his own way of life. It may also have occurred to some of them 
that in its original context the Euripidean maxim was not presented neutrally as a 
universal moral principle. Rather, it was a provocative contribution to an unresolved 
ideological debate: Zethus represented social and political pragmosyne, in stark 
opposition to his brother Amphion, who advocated leisure, artistic pursuits and 
political quietism. 
  In the comic version, only the first verse from Antiope is retained. The second 
verse is a paratragic pastiche representing the parasite’s own thoughts, and the third 
verse is taken from a completely different Euripidean play (Iphigenia among the 
Taurians 535). Diphilus, like Antiphanes, has run together several sources to produce 
a seamless tragicomic mash-up which (just about) makes sense on its own terms but is 
utterly bizarre. He then challenges his audience to identify the source(s) of the 
quotation, by making character B ask πόθεν ἐστὶ ταῦτα, πρὸς θεῶν; (‘Where the hell 
are those lines from?’) Essentially this is a tantalizing quiz question to which no 
answer is supplied: it is up to the audience to fill in the blanks for themselves.54 But 
the point is that maxim-collecting and quotation culture are being treated by Diphilus, 
in a sophisticated and multi-layered manner, as subjects of humour in their own right. 
All of these traits – the quotation and subversion of tragedy, the ostentatious 
deployment of literary knowledge, and the ironical attitude towards decontextualized 
quotation – can be seen to underpin the humour in our final example (Nicostratus fr. 
29): 
 
‘οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πάντ᾽ ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖ’· 
νὴ τὴν Ἀθηνὰν συντόμως γε, φίλτατε 
Εὐριπίδη, τὸν βίον ἔθηκας εἰς στίχον. 
‘No man exists who is fortunate in every respect...’ Yes, by Athena, that’s right! 




54 Cf. a similar technique in Antiphanes, Traumatias fr. 205, where characters argue 
about whether quotations are taken from Euripides or Philoxenus, before concluding 
‘it doesn’t make the slightest difference’ (οὐθεν διαφέρει). 
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Here Nicostratus’ character is quoting (without attribution) a verse from Euripides’ 
tragedy Stheneboea that had already become famous within antiquity as a free-
floating maxim.55 The original source of the line and its sentiment are apparently 
irrelevant in its comic setting. What matters is the speaker’s obvious sarcasm and the 
underlying attitude that it denotes. The idea that the meaning of life can really be 
summed up in a dinky quotable soundbite, as Euripides seems to do, comes to seem 
ludicrous. 
All these comic passages reflect the popular culture of the fifth and fourth 
centuries, and they provide evidence for the contemporary status of tragedy – as 
classic literature, as representative of ‘high’ culture in contrast with the ‘low’ genre of 
comedy, as source of moral wisdom and authority, and as repository of maxims par 
excellence. It seems clear that when comedy itself uses maxims, as it does more and 
more frequently from the fourth century onwards, it does so in a way that 




Faced with dozens of stray quotations (a.k.a. fragments) and hardly any dramatic 
contexts in which to situate them, we will find it impossible to reach a wholly 
definitive conclusion. As always when dealing with fragmentary texts, caution is 
needed; generalizations must be carefully qualified; we need to allow for the 
possibility that our ideas may be quite wrong. Nevertheless, this article has aimed to 
establish two important points. First, it is clear that quotable maxims are a very 
distinctive feature of later Greek comedy, marking a significant new development 
from comedy of the fifth century. Second, it has been argued that the concept of 
‘inverted commas’ can in several different senses bring us closer to understanding 
how maxims function within comedy. Even when we have only decontextualized 
fragments in front of us, the ‘inverted commas’ approach can offer us a possible way 
of making sense of them – and this way strikes me as considerably more convincing 
(that is to say, more intellectually satisfying and better nuanced) than any 
straightforwardly literal readings of their content.  
 
55 Eur. fr. 661 Kannicht: cf. Wright (2016). 
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On the basis of the discussion above, it emerges that many (I do not say all) 
comic maxims can be read in a way that is jocular or ironical rather than serious and 
literal. The traditional form of the quotable maxim allows the comedians to lay claim 
to serious ethical concerns, but they often turn out to be playing a game with their 
audiences. The specific content of these maxims, or the mode in which they are 
deployed, encourages us to question any authority that they might appear to possess. 
These utterances might seem to embody confident general statements of truth or 
universal wisdom, but in fact they are usually much more provisional or provocative.   
It remains possible (I concede) that some of these comedians may have been 
deadly earnest in their ethical aims, but it is hard to find a single definite example of 
this among our sources. What we have found, time after time, is that these poets are 
trying to make us laugh – at traditional popular wisdom, at other genres of literature 
that seem to embody wisdom, at over-simplistic attempts to unearth an author’s 
meaning or moral message in a text, or even at quotation culture itself. In this respect, 
they are comparable to that other extraordinary aphorist, Oscar Wilde, to whom I give 
the last word: ‘Art is the only serious thing in the world. And the artist is the only 
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